| 引用本文: | 祝世京,戴建设,陈珽.动态协商对策的诱导平衡*[J].控制理论与应用,1997,14(2):249~253.[点击复制] |
| ZHU Shijing，DAI Jianshe and CHEN Ting.Incentive Equilibria for Dynamic Bargaining Game Problems[J].Control Theory and Technology,1997,14(2):249~253.[点击复制] |
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| 动态协商对策的诱导平衡* |
| Incentive Equilibria for Dynamic Bargaining Game Problems |
| 摘要点击 718 全文点击 374 投稿时间：1995-09-04 修订日期：1996-07-08 |
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| DOI编号 |
| 1997,14(2):249-253 |
| 中文关键词 动态对策 协商解 诱导平衡 |
| 英文关键词 dynamic game bargaining solution incentive equilibria |
| 基金项目 |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 本文研究了动态对策协商解的问题，提出了动态对策问题在协商解处的诱导平衡的概念，研究了诱导平衡存在的必要条件和充分条件，并分析了线性二次型动态对策问题的诱导平衡. |
| 英文摘要 |
| Based on the incentive methods of Stackelberg game，the dynamic bargaining game problems are considered and the concept of incentive equilibria about the bargaining solutions is proposed. A sufficient condition and a necessary condition concerning the existence of incentive equilibria are proposed. As an illustrative example，the incentive equilibria for linear-quadratic games are discussed. |