| 引用本文: | 麦均洪.关于一类风险投资的动态博弈模型及分析[J].控制理论与应用,2016,33(8):1105~1110.[点击复制] |
| maijunhong.A dynamic game model for a class of venture investment behaviors[J].Control Theory and Technology,2016,33(8):1105~1110.[点击复制] |
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| 关于一类风险投资的动态博弈模型及分析 |
| A dynamic game model for a class of venture investment behaviors |
| 摘要点击 2227 全文点击 1343 投稿时间：2014-02-13 修订日期：2016-09-21 |
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| DOI编号 10.7641/CTA.2016.40093 |
| 2016,33(8):1105-1110 |
| 中文关键词 不完全契约 套牢 讨价还价 有限责任约束 动态博弈 |
| 英文关键词 incomplete contract hold-up bargaining limited liability constraint dynamic game |
| 基金项目 |
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| 中文摘要 |
| “套牢”是在各类投资行为里广泛存在的问题. 本文以高新技术企业和风险投资机构之间的合作研发行为
为基础, 基于不完全契约理论的建模方法, 在动态博弈的框架内引入讨价还价因子对其中的“套牢”问题进行了分
析. 研究结果表明, 讨价还价能力是影响是否存在研发激励不足问题的一个重要因素, 在不受到有限责任约束的情
形下, 如果高新技术企业讨价还价能力更强, 对其研发激励也更强, 而在受到有限责任约束时, 高新技术企业在研发
阶段的投资激励则随其讨价还价能力的增强而减弱. 最后通过一个算例对所得到的结论进行了检验. |
| 英文摘要 |
| The hold-up problem is an interesting issue in incomplete contract theory for different kinds of investment
behaviors. It has been agreed that hold-up would result of insufficient investment. For the cooperative R & D between
high-tech companies and venture investor, this paper builds a dynamic game model which includes the bargaining power
to analyze the hold-problem. The analysis results imply that bargaining power between high-tech companies and venture
investor is an important factor and affect the invest incentive of high-tech companies. If there has no limited liability constraint,
investment incentive will increase with the high-tech companies’ bargaining power, otherwise investment incentive
will decrease with the high-tech companies’ bargaining power. Finally, the results are verified by a specific example. |