| 引用本文: | 赵文会,祁宇,范韩璐.区域电网的主从博弈调度[J].控制理论与应用,2018,35(5):644~652.[点击复制] |
| ZHAO Wen-hui,QI Yu,FAN Han-lu.Stackelberg game scheduling for regional power grids[J].Control Theory and Technology,2018,35(5):644~652.[点击复制] |
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| 区域电网的主从博弈调度 |
| Stackelberg game scheduling for regional power grids |
| 摘要点击 2555 全文点击 997 投稿时间：2017-08-19 修订日期：2018-05-23 |
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| DOI编号 10.7641/CTA.2018.70589 |
| 2018,35(5):644-652 |
| 中文关键词 区域电网调度 分时上网电价 削峰填谷 主从博弈 |
| 英文关键词 dispatching of regional grid step tariff shaving peaks and filling valleys Stackelberg game |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金项目(71403163), 上海市哲学社科规划基金项目(2014BJB017), 中国博士后科学基金项目(2013M540910)资助. |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 针对当前风、光、储、火组成的区域能源网络经济效益不突出, 以及传统火电机组减排的问题, 本文建立了一种
主从博弈模型, 将电网运营商和发电商作为不同地位决策者, 通过优化电网运营商制定的分时上网电价与发电商的调度
控制策略, 对上级电网进行“削峰填谷”, 实现发电商自身的经济效益以及环境效益的最大化. 在模型中, 选择电网运营
商制定的分时上网电价作为主体, 发电商收益作为从体, 主体以降低CO2, SO2的排放量为目标, 从体以提高发电商自身
的收益为目标; 按照风光储系统的运行模式, 其主网所处的峰/平/谷运行时段以及整个网络发/用电供需平衡状况, 综合
考虑火电机组的环境效益和发电系统的经济性, 对分布式能源以及传统火电厂的调度进行优化. 最后, 将构建的主从博
弈模型在IEEE 10机系统算例中进行仿真, 对模型的有效性以及分时上网电价的引导作用能否整个系统实现经济效益和
环境效益的双赢进行验证. |
| 英文摘要 |
| In view of the poor economic benefits of regional power grid consisting of wind, photovoltaics, energy
storage system, thermal power plant and the emissions of traditional thermal power unit. In this paper, a Stackelberg Game
Model that sets the grid operators and generators as decision makers in different positions is established. In the model,
the step tariff set by grid operators and the dispatching control strategy of generators are optimized to realize the shaving
peaks and filling valleys of superior power grid and to maximize the generators’ economic and environmental benefits. In
the model, the prices during various periods set by the grid operators are regarded as a principle party and the earnings
of generator are regarded as a subordinate party. The principle party aims to reduce the emission of CO2 and SO2, the
subordinate party sets improving its own profits as a target. According to different operation modes of wind-pv-es hybrid
system, the running period and supply-demand situation of the whole gird, the dispatching of distributed energy resource
and traditional thermal power plant is optimized with consideration of the environmental benefits of thermal power units
and the economic performance of the generator. Finally, the Stackelberg Game Model is simulated in the IEEE 10 system
to verify the effectiveness of the model and whether the step tariff can allow the whole system to achieve both economic
and environmental benefits. |
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