| 引用本文: | 马永红,苏鑫,赵越.产业共性技术扩散的演化博弈分析[J].控制理论与应用,2019,36(1):22~31.[点击复制] |
| MA Yong-hong,SU Xin,ZHAO Yue.Evolutionary game analysis on industrial generic technology diffusion[J].Control Theory and Technology,2019,36(1):22~31.[点击复制] |
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| 产业共性技术扩散的演化博弈分析 |
| Evolutionary game analysis on industrial generic technology diffusion |
| 摘要点击 2584 全文点击 1229 投稿时间：2018-05-17 修订日期：2018-12-11 |
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| DOI编号 10.7641/CTA.2018.80363 |
| 2019,36(1):22-31 |
| 中文关键词 产业共性技术 技术扩散 累积前景理论 博弈理论 |
| 英文关键词 industrial generic technology technology transfer cumulative prospect theory game theory |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金项目(71373060), 国家社会科学基金重点项目(14GL004), 黑龙江省社会科学基金项目(13D011), 黑龙江省自然科学基金项目 (G201404)资助. |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 基于产业共性技术扩散的演化机理分析, 结合累积前景理论, 构建产业共性技术扩散三阶段演化博弈模型,
研究不同演化阶段产业共性技术扩散的主体行为及影响机制. 结果表明: 政府对产业共性技术采纳起到决定性作
用, 在产业共性技术二次创新过程中起到中介作用, 但对共性技术产品定价作用不大; 企业对二次创新方式的选择,
更多考虑创新知识溢出而不是额外收益; 在附随产品扩散阶段, 产业共性技术的技术性能是影响扩散的首要因素. |
| 英文摘要 |
| Based on the evolution mechanism analysis of industrial generic technology diffusion, combined with the cumulative
prospect theory, the three stage evolutionary game model of industrial generic technology diffusion is constructed,
and the subject behavior and influence mechanism of industrial generic technology diffusion in different stages of evolution
are analyzed. The conclusion indicated that the government plays a decisive role in the adoption of industrial generic
technology, and an important intermediary role in the secondary innovation process, but it has little effect on the pricing
of generic technology products; more consideration is given to the enterprise’s knowledge spillover of innovation rather
than the additional income in the process of choosing innovation method; the technical performance of industrial generic
technology is the primary factor affecting diffusion in the accompanying product diffusion stage. |
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